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America’s Atomic Spies
JAMES J. WIRTZ
Vince Houghton: The Nuclear Spies: America’s Atomic Intelligence Operation Against
Hitler and Stalin
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2019, 248 p., $27.95 (cloth).
The story of the U.S. “front-line”
intelligence effort to assess the Nazi
nuclear weapons program during World
War II has usually taken the form of a
minor footnote in the narrative about
the Manhattan Project, America’s
successful effort to fabricate a fission
weapon. Many of the scientists who
joined the Manhattan Project did so out
of a fear that the Nazis would be first to
acquire a nuclear weapon, especially
since some of the leading physicists and
chemists of the day—Werner
Heisenberg, Otto Hahn, and the French
scientist Frederic Joiot-Curie—were
alive and well and busily conducting
research inside Nazi-occupied Europe.
As Vince Houghton reports in this
beautifully written and well-researched
history, the American scientific and
strategic community believed they were
in a race with Nazi physics, and they
had a nagging fear that they might not
win that race. The intelligence effort to
discern what the Nazis were up to
became a priority for the U.S. scientific
and intelligence community during the
Second World War.
As the conflict progressed, the
Allies encountered a steady stream of
technological innovations and
extraordinary weapons courtesy of the
Third Reich—the V-1 cruise missile, the
V-2 ballistic missile, deadly Tiger Tanks,
the ME 262 jet fighter, and even the
MP44 assault rifle. These weapons
served to confirm their worst
nightmares about the prowess of the
Nazi defense industry. Rumors, spotty
information about the activities and
whereabouts of leading German
physicists, and an abundance of “heavy
water” (D2O), which could be used as a
moderator in a nuclear reactor, created
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a crisis atmosphere among senior
officers and scientists within the
Manhattan Project. Thus, when the U.S.
project “Alsos,” a highly secretive
collection and analysis team made up of
scientists and military intelligence
officers, finally crossed the front line
following the Normandy invasion and
began to return reports and analysis, the
Allied High Command breathed a
collective sigh of relief. Documents,
personnel, and laboratory equipment
revealed that the Nazi program was
about as advanced as the American
program was in 1940. The Nazis were
not going to build a nuclear weapon;
even the construction of a dirty bomb
seemed to be beyond their technical
ability. The Alsos team told General
Dwight Eisenhower that he could stand
down: the Supreme Allied Expeditionary
Headquarters (SHAEF) no longer had to
plan for a high-casualty offensive to end
the war quickly to head off a Nazi
nuclear weapon. The U.S. effort to build
an atomic bomb, however, was not
terminated. Although the danger of a
Nazi nuclear weapon had passed, the
Manhattan Project continued, much to
the chagrin of some of the scientists
working on the American bomb back in
Alamogordo, New Mexico.
Houghton’s story confirms the three
elements of the traditional historical
narrative about atomic intelligence
during World War II: (1) fear of Nazi
science motivated the Manhattan
Project; (2) before the end of the war,
American “front-line” intelligence
discovered that the Nazis would not get
the bomb; and (3) the Manhattan
Project continued after it was discovered
that the Nazis had never really entered
the race to build a nuclear weapon.
Nevertheless, Houghton’s rich narrative
gives context and color to these events.
Once they realized that it was actually
possible to construct a nuclear weapon,
for example, U.S. officials were
determined not only to acquire a bomb
but also to prevent others from
developing a nuclear weapon. They also
were keen to keep the discovery of
information about the existence of a
U.S. nuclear weapons program secret, to
avoid prompting others to launch their
own project to build a bomb. In a sense,
the Alsos mission was both
administratively and scientifically part of
the Manhattan Project—the intelligence
mission sought strategic information to
gauge U.S. progress in building the
bomb against its most likely competitor
and was never intended to substantiate
or nullify the basic decision to acquire a
nuclear weapon.
The Nuclear Spies also explores the
administrative, scientific, logistical, and
intelligence aspects of the effort to
collect, analyze, and disseminate
information about a weapon that at the
time was neither fully understood nor
developed. Houghton describes this
effort as “scientific intelligence” because
it involved gathering information about
research and laboratory experiments,
not “technological intelligence” about an
existing weapon. The Alsos mission was
in fact a remarkable example of
intelligence work. Intelligence
requirements were well understood,
allowing collection plans to be clearly
specified and continuously refined.
Those involved in collecting data and
securing European scientists were well
qualified to assess and analyze the
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intelligence take while they still were in
the field. Definitive analysis was
communicated quickly and clearly to
senior officers and officials who were in
desperate need of information about the
state of Nazi nuclear research, which
had an immediate impact on current
and future policy. The wartime climate
and the critical need to assess a potential
nuclear threat best explains why
scientists, military intelligence officers,
and senior officials worked together
without the usual bureaucratic battles
and cultural misunderstandings.
Nevertheless, the fact that this highly
actionable intelligence made its way
immediately to policymakers who could,
and did, put it to good use is not exactly
a common story in the annals of the
intelligence–policy nexus.
The success and operational beauty of
the Alsos mission is not just of historical
or academic significance. For several
decades, the bulk of Research &
Development (R&D) activities have
moved from government laboratories to
the private sector, opening up new
avenues for “scientific” intelligence
analysis. In the past, governments
controlled the directions and pace of
scientific progress in fields related to
weapons development because
government funding was largely
responsible for relevant R&D efforts.
Today, the private sector is responsible
for the bulk of R&D, and priorities only
roughly correspond to the needs of the
defense industry. As a result, intelligence
officials now confront a situation in
which they face the possibility that
domestic or foreign commercial firms
might develop new technologies or
uncover innovative science that might
have important military applications. At
any moment, private sector R&D can
yield unanticipated scientific discoveries
or innovations that can produce game-
changing battlefield applications.
Today, the list of “Manhattan-like”
projects underway in the private and
government realm is long. Advances in
artificial intelligence and data science,
quantum computing, autonomy,
biotechnology, modeling and
simulation, and hypersonic vehicles are
continuously in the news, leaving the
casual observer to wonder how the
intelligence community maintains the
capability to undertake scientific
intelligence in such a wide array of
fields. Additionally, because so much of
this research is conducted in the private
sector, one wonders if the legal and
administrative mechanisms are in place
to give intelligence agencies access to
vast amounts of proprietary information
of potentially staggering value. The
intelligence community also has to deal
with a rate of scientific progress that is
more akin to the pace of wartime
innovation without the same sense of
urgency. The exigencies of wartime are
not available to cut through everyday
bureaucratic, cultural, or even legal
impediments that facilitated the
exquisite intelligence work undertaken
by the Alsos team.
The exploits of the Alsos mission
chronicled in The Atomic Spies, and the
story of the subsequent less successful
effort to predict the timeline of the
Soviet acquisition of the bomb, is a tale
that should be read by all those
interested in intelligence. So much of
intelligence studies focuses on failure
that it is sometimes difficult to identify,
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much less read, a detailed description of
intelligence success. The fact that
scientists, officers, and officials in
Alamogordo; Washington, D.C.; and
SHAEF were given probably the most
important piece of wartime intelligence
in such an authoritative, compelling,
and politically and militarily useful
manner sets an incredibly high bar for
the intelligence–policy nexus.
Overt Chronicle of Covert Operations
CARL ANTHONY WEGE
Annie Jacobsen: Surprise, Kill, Vanish: The Secret History of CIA Paramilitary
Armies, Operators, and Assassins
Little, Brown and Company, New York, Boston, London, 2019, 545 p.,
$18.57 (Hardcover).
In Surprise, Kill, Vanish, Annie
Jacobsen—a Princeton graduate,
acclaimed New York Times journalist,
and Pulitzer Prize finalist—compiles
archive sources and hundreds of hours
of interviews with current and former
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
paramilitaries, to create one of the first
histories narrating the story of the CIA’s
Special Operations Group (SOG)
Ground Branch. The book is a
welcomed addition to the bookshelves
of practitioners and students of
intelligence history alike. Jacobsen
begins her chronicle by explaining the
title of the book. She notes that the
motto of Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) Jedburghs—a joint Allied
program, among the OSS Special
Operations, the British Special
Operations Executive, and the French
Central Bureau of Intelligence and
Action—fighting behind Nazi lines was
“Surprise, Kill, Vanish.” Next, the
author explains that covert actions—
sometimes referred to as the president’s
“hidden hand”—operate between war
and diplomacy. The author notes that
during the earliest OSS professional
training, the French Operational Group
of Jedburghs taught irregular warfare
techniques to future Agency directors
Richard Helms and William Casey. The
Jedburgh Team code named Team
Hugh became the first OSS team
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